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This paper reports an experimental study on three well known solutions for
claims problems, that is, the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and
the constrained equal-losses rules. To do this, we ﬁrst let subjects play three
games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the
recommendation of one of these three rules. Moreover, we also let subjects play
an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy proﬁles in
which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium.
While in the ﬁrst three games subjects’ play easily converges to the unique
equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails
as a coordination device. We also administered a questionnaire to a diﬀerent
group of students, asking them to act as an impartial arbitrator to solve (among
others) the same claims situations played in the lab. Also in this case, the
proportional solution was selected by the vast majority of respondents.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
When a ﬁrm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided among
its creditors? Previous question is an example of the so called claims (or
bankruptcy) problems (or situations), which provide with a simple framework to
study ways of distributing losses when agents’ claims cannot be fully satisﬁed.
Another example of a claims situation, and most likely the oldest one in the
literature of rationing, is the division of an estate: a man dies and the debts
he leaves behind are found to add up more than the worth of his estate. How
should then the estate be divided? [see O’Neill (1982) or Rabinovitch (1973),
among others, borrowing examples from the Babylonian Talmud]. Tax schemes
can also be interpreted as claims problems: a certain amount of money should
be collected out of individual gross incomes. What should be the net income
of everyone in society? Or equivalently, what should be the contribution of
each individual? [Young (1988, 1990)]. Rationing occurs when commodities
have ﬁxed prices, and also gives rise to claims problems. An example of that is
medical triage, when the available resources are not enough to cover individual
medical needs. What sort of needs should be rationed? [Winslow (1992)].
In the literature of arbitration [e.g., Elkouri (1952), Spielmans (1939)], rights
arbitration refers to situations covered by pre-existing rules or customs. When
a dispute has arisen because rules are unclear, the arbitrator makes a judgement
about the meaning of the rules, and in this way she decides the parties’ rights.
Claims problems are major practical issues and, as such, they have a long
history, both from legal and economic viewpoints. In general, claimants belong
to diﬀerent types (e.g., senior creditors, junior creditors and shareholders, in
the case of a bankrupt ﬁrm), and, accordingly, there is some sort of priority
of claims. In some cases, bankruptcy regulations respect absolute priority (i.e.,
senior creditors are paid oﬀ ﬁrst, then junior creditors, and ﬁnally shareholders),
but, in other cases, a portion of value is reserved for shareholders (10%-20%)
[Hart (1999)]. Then, awards are allocated among the claimants in the diﬀerent
groups, according to some method (e.g., proportional to the claims).
In the tax example, the most common method to allocate losses is not the
proportional one. In general, progressive schemes are used instead, so that
agents with larger incomes contribute relatively more. One of those schemes
is the so called leveling tax [Young (1988)], that aims at equalizing after-tax
income across the agents, without subsidies.
Similarly, consider the case of an irrigation community, facing a drought.
Here, again, is not the proportional method the one generally used, but alter-
native schemes in which some sort of priority of the largest claimants prevail.
Previous examples indicate that not all claims problems are, in practice,
solved in the same way, or, in other words, that diﬀerent claims situations
may ask for diﬀerent views of distributive justice to be properly solved. Con-
sequently, from practical cases, researches moved in the direction of looking
for well-behaved methods, or rules, to solve families of claims problems, when
agents belong to the same type, so that they only diﬀer in their claims [see
Moulin (2002) or Thomson (2003) for recent surveys of this literature]. The
oldest formal principle of distributive justice follows Aristotle’s maxim:
“Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion to
relevant similarities and diﬀerences”.
2Its direct application to claims situations gives rise to the best-known rule
to solve claims problems: the proportional rule, which recommends awards to
be proportional to claims. This is the rule normally used in many bankruptcy
regulations. Its rational comes from the fact that -take, for example, the case
of shareholders- proportionality amounts to award equally each share.
Ad i ﬀerent idea of equality underlies another well-known rule: the con-
strained equal-awards rule. It makes awards as equal as possible to all claimants,
subject to the condition that no one receives more than her claim. A dual for-
mulation of equality, focusing on the losses creditors incur, as opposed to what
they receive, underlies the constrained equal-losses rule. It proposes losses as
equal as possible for all claimants, subject to the condition that no one ends
up with a negative award. This rule corresponds to the previously mentioned
leveling tax in the case of tax schemes. Its rational, in this case, corresponds to
the idea of looking for the most egalitarian after-tax income distribution. The
constrained equal awards rule gives priority to agents with small claims. They
are reimbursed relatively more than agents with larger claims. It seems a nat-
ural procedure to apply when agents claims are correlated with their incomes.
On the contrary, the constrained equal-losses rule gives priority to agents with
large claims. They start receiving money before agents with small claims, that
are only reimbursed once the loss they experience equals the losses experienced
by agents with larger claims. It is a natural procedure to be applied when
claims are related to needs, as for example when we think of public support of
health care expenses. These two ideas of equality also have a long history, and
have been advocated by many authors, including Maimonides (12th Century)
[Aumann and Maschler (1985)]
The behavior of the diﬀerent rules comes from the properties those rules
fulﬁll. The analysis and formulation of properties and the search for combination
of properties characterizing a single rule is the object of an important branch
of the claims literature: the so called axiomatic approach. The proportional,
constrained equal-awards and constrained equal-losses rules satisfy many basic
properties. Looking specially to those three solutions is by no means arbitrary.
First because they are among the most common methods of solving practical
problems. Second for their long tradition in history. And last but not least,
because they are the only ones satisfying the four basic invariance axioms within
the family of solutions that treat equally equal claims [Moulin (2000)].
Another approach to solve claims problems is that of cooperative game the-
ory, in which claims problems are formulated either as TU coalitional games,
or as bargaining problems, and rules are derived from solutions to coalitional
games and from bargaining solutions, respectively. Instances of this approach
are the papers of O’Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985), Curiel, Maschler
and Tijs (1988) and Dagan and Volij (1993). The axiomatic, as well as the coop-
erative game-theoretic approach share a common view in the analysis of claims
problems: they look at the fairness and cooperative aspects in order to support
certain rules.
Finally, a limited number of papers applies noncooperative game-theory to
deal with claims problems [Chun (1989), Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997),
Moreno-Ternero (2002) and Herrero (2003)]. These papers apply to claims
problems the same methodology known as the Nash program for the theory of
bargaining, that is, they construct speciﬁc procedures as noncooperative games
which have the property that the unique equilibrium allocation corresponds to
3that dictated by a speciﬁcr u l e[ N a s h( 1 9 5 3 ) ,B i n m o r eet al. (1992), Roemer
(1996)]. In other words, this literature provides theoretical support to certain
rules by constructing speciﬁc strategic situations for which these rules are self-
enforcing.
There is another aspect which makes this noncooperative approach interest-
ing for the analysis of claims situations. As it happens for bargaining theory,
the theoretical debate is far from unanimous in identifying a unique optimal so-
lution to claims problems. In consequence, there are many situations in which
an arbitrator, or the outside authority in charge to design the procedure to
solve a claims problem, may not have strict preferences, a priori, on which rule
should be implemented for the problem at stake. Under these circumstances,
the arbitrator may resort to a (noncooperative) procedure which may lead to
alternative rules as the outcome of strategic interaction among the claimants.
The aim of this paper is to bring the theoretical debate on the selection
among rules to solve claims problems into an experimental lab. Our main in-
terest can be summarized as follows:
is there any particular rule which is salient in subjects’ perception as the
optimal solution of a claims situation?
To answer this question, two lines of research are open. One, very much
in line with the axiomatic approach, is to provide subjects with hypothetical
claims situations and ask them, taking the point of view of an outside observer,
to choose a particular rule to solve it. The results of such a questionnaire
potentially provide some experimental evidence to be compared with the ax-
iomatic theoretical debate. Another possibility is to fully exploit the exper-
imental methodology and provide subjects with an active role in the claims
situation, that is, designing hypothetical situations in which they are actual
claimants rather than simply outside observers. This alternative approach is
clearly more in line with the noncooperative literature mentioned above. The
results of such an experiment may provide with some experimental evidence of
the way agents play when involved in real claims problems.
In this paper we follow both approaches, and the results we obtain are to
be considered as complementaries. In both cases, we focus on a claims problem
involving three agents, and ask subjects to choose among three diﬀerent divisions
of the liquidation value, corresponding, respectively, to the recommendations of
the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses and proportional rules.
We ﬁrst selected 120 students (10 sessions involving 12 subjects each) to
play a sequence of games in the lab. In particular, we asked subjects to play for
money the (noncooperative) procedures of Chun (1989), Moreno-Ternero (2002)
and Herrero (2003) when applied to t h es a m eb a n k r u p t c yp r o b l e m .W ef o c u s e d
on these three procedures because they share the same game-form (claimants
are required, simultaneously, to propose a rule) and because they display very
similar strategic properties (namely, there is always a player with a weakly dom-
inant strategy by which she can force the outcome of the game in her favor). If
subjects recognize the strategic incentives induced by each game, then choosing
a particular procedure may be equivalent to choose a particular rule to solve
the problem.
Then, we also considered an additional procedure (a simple “majority game”)
that has the property that all (and only) strategy proﬁles in which players co-
4ordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. This additional
game has no selection incentives, but coordination incentives only. Thus, we
used this game to investigate, in a more compelling way, which rule may emerge
as the optimal solution of the strategic situation subjects are involved in.
In addition, we also wanted to check whether subjects’ play in games with
such strong strategic properties would be sensitive to framing eﬀects.A s w e
mentioned earlier, diﬀerent rules are to be considered more appropriate depend-
ing on the problem at stake. Therefore, we explained each procedure to subjects
with a diﬀerent “story” (somehow consistent with the rule supported by the pro-
cedure) and compare the results with those in which the same procedures were
played under a completely “unframed” scenario, where only monetary payoﬀs
associated to strategy proﬁles were provided. We did so to see whether diﬀerent
frames may have induced subjects to behave diﬀerently.
We here brieﬂys u m m a r i z et h em a i nﬁndings of this experiment. While in the
ﬁrst three procedures subjects’ play easily converges to the unique equilibrium
rule even in the ﬁrst rounds, in the majority procedure the proportional rule
overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device. As for the framing issue, we
ﬁnd that frames have some impact on subjects’ behavior only in the majority
game. As for the other procedures, strategic considerations appear so compelling
to render framing eﬀects negligible.
The alternative approach consisted in selecting a diﬀerent group of 120 stu-
dents, administering them a questionnaire in which they were asked to choose
their preferred rule from the viewpoint of an arbitrator in charge to resolve,
among others, the same claims situations played in the lab by the other group
of subjects. Consistently with our experimental ﬁndings, the proportional so-
lution prevailed as the modal choice for 90% of the respondents. Nonetheless,
individuals also showed to be sensitive to the particular situation at hand.
Despite the extensive experimental literature on related issues such as bar-
gaining [see Ochs and Roth (1989), and the literature cited therein], or arbitra-
tion [see Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), or Ashenfelter et al. (1992), and the
literature cited therein], this is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst experi-
ment on bankruptcy games. The closest reference to our work is the paper of
Cuadras-Morató et al. (2001). They investigate, by way of questionnaires, the
equity properties of diﬀerent rules in the context of health care problems. In
this respect, they ﬁnd that, when asked to choose among six potential alloca-
tions (including the proportional and the constrained equal losses rule) using
the perspective on an “impartial judge” in the context of health care problems,
subjects display a slight preference for the constrained equal losses solution.
A related paper is also Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), where diﬀerent bargaining
solutions are investigated also by means of questionnaires.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally
introduce claims problems, the three rules, and the noncooperative procedures
object of the experiment. Section 3 is devoted to the experimental design. In
Section 4 we report our experimental results. In section 5 we report on the
results of the questionnaire. Conclusions, comments and further proposals are
presented in Section 6. An Appendix contains the proofs of some theoretical
results related to our study and the experimental and questionnaire instructions.
52 Claims problems, rules and procedures
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a set of agents with generic elements i and j.Aclaims




i∈N ci >E>0. In words, ci is the claim of agent i over a certain
amount (the estate) E. Let B denote the class of such problems. Without loss
of generality, let c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cn.1
A rule is a mapping r : B → <n that associates with every problem (c,E) a
unique allocation r(c,E) such that:




(iii) For all i,j ∈ N,i fci ≥ cj then ri(c,E) ≥ rj(c,E) and ci − ri(c,E) ≥
cj − rj(c,E).
The allocation r(c,E) is interpreted as a desirable way of dividing E among
the agents in N.R e q u i r e m e n t(i) is that each agent receives an award that is
non-negative and bounded above by her claim. Requirement (ii) is that the
entire amount must be allocated. Finally, requirement (iii) is that agents with
higher claims receive higher awards and face higher losses.2 We denote by R
the set of all such rules.
Next, we introduce the three rules focus of our study. The constrained equal-
awards rule makes awards as equal as possible, subject to no agent receiving
more than her claim. The proportional rule distributes awards proportionally
to claims. The constrained equal-losses rule m a k e sl o s s e sa se q u a la sp o s s i b l e ,
subject to the condition that no agent ends up with a negative award.
The constrained equal-awards rule, cea,s e l e c t sf o ra l l(c,E) ∈ B,t h ev e c t o r
(min{ci,λ})i∈N,w h e r eλ>0 is chosen so that
P
i∈N min{ci,λ} = E .
The proportional rule, p,s e l e c t sf o ra l l(c,E) ∈ B, the vector λc,w h e r eλ is
chosen so that
P
i∈N λci = E.
The constrained equal-losses rule, cel,s e l e c t sf o ra l l(c,E) ∈ B, the vector
(max{0,c i − λ})i∈N,w h e r eλ>0 is chosen so that
P
i∈N max{0,c i − λ} = E.
Remark 1 Note that for all (c,E) ∈ B and all r ∈ R, cel1(c,E) ≥ r1(c,E)
and cean(c,E) ≥ rn(c,E).I no t h e rw o r d s ,cel (cea)i st h em o s tp r e f e r r e dr u l e
by the highest (lowest) claimant among all rules belonging to R.
As we mentioned in the introduction, these rules are salient in the theoretical
debate on the way of solving claims problems. This may induce to select these
rules over other alternatives. On the other hand, and as in the case of bargaining
problems, the literature seems far from unanimous in proposing au n i q u erule
to solve claims situations relying on axiomatic properties only. This opens the
possibility of approaching claims problems by using alternative techniques.
1In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to agent 1 (n), that is, the agent with the
h i g h e s t( l o w e s t )c l a i m ,a st h ehighest (lowest) claimant.
2While conditions (i) and (ii) are standard in the deﬁnition of a rule, requirement (iii) is
considered in the claims literature as an independent axiom called order preservation,a n da n y
rule satisfying condition (iii) is said to belong to the set of order preserving rules. Since all
the rules object of our experiment satisfy condition (iii), we shall abuse standard terminology
by referring to order preserving rules as simply “rules”.
62.1 Noncooperative solutions to claims problems
Let us now focus on some noncooperative procedures proposed to solve claims
situations. All these procedures share the same game-form: agents simulta-
neously propose a rule belonging to the set R, and the procedure selects a
particular division of the amount accordingly. Moreover, all procedures share
another common feature: if all agents agree in a particular allocation, then this
allocation is selected as the solution to the problem.
In the diminishing claims procedure, if agents do not agree in a particular al-
location, their claims are reduced by substituting them with the highest amount
assigned to every agent by the chosen rules. Agents’ rules are then applied to
the resulting problem after adjusting claims. If they coincide in the allocation to
the new problem, this is the solution the procedure provides. Otherwise, claims
are reduced again. If the process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps,
the limit of the resulting claims vectors (if it exists) is chosen as solution to the
problem. Otherwise, nobody gets anything.
Diminishing claims procedure (P1) [Chun (1989)]. Let (c,E) ∈ B be given.
Each player i ∈ N chooses a rule ri ∈ R,w i t hr−i denoting the strategy proﬁle
selected by i’s opponents. Let r =
©
ri,r−iª
be the proﬁle of rules reported. The
division proposed by the diminishing claims procedure, dc[r,(c,E)] is obtained
as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c1,E). If ri(c1,E)=rj(c1,E),
for all i,j ∈ N,t h e ndc[r,(c,E)] = ri(c1,E).O t h e r w i s e ,g ot ot h en e x ts t e p .
Step 2. For all i ∈ N,l e tc2
i =m a x j∈N r
j
i(c1,E). For all j ∈ N, calculate
rj(c2,E).I fri(c2,E)=rj(c2,E), for all i,j ∈ N,t h e ndc[r,(c,E)] = ri(c2,E).
Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step k+1. For all i ∈ N,l e tc
k+1
i =m a x j∈N r
j
i(ck,E). For all j ∈ N,
calculate rj(ck+1,E).I f rj(ck+1,E)=ri(ck+1,E), for all i,j ∈ N,t h e n
dc[r,(c,E)] = ri(ck+1,E).O t h e r w i s e ,g ot ot h en e x ts t e p .
If previous process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, then:
Limit case.C o m p u t elimt→∞ ct. If it converges to an allocation x∗ such that P
i∈N x∗
i ≤ E, then x∗ = dc[r,(c,E)].O t h e r w i s e ,dc[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the proportional concessions procedure, if agents do not agree in the pro-
posed allocation, they receive the proportional share of half the liquidation
value. Agents’ rules are then applied to divide the remainder after adjusting
claims. If they coincide in the allocation to the new problem, then the solution
the procedure provides is the allocation plus the concessions in the ﬁrst stage.
Otherwise, the process starts again. If it does not terminate in a ﬁnite number
of steps, then the limit of the aggregation of concessions (if it exists) is chosen
as solution to the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets anything.
Proportional concessions procedure (P2) [Moreno-Ternero (2002)]. Let
(c,E) ∈ B be given. Each player i ∈ N chooses a rule ri ∈ R,w i t hr−i




proﬁle of rules reported. The division proposed by the proportional concessions
procedure, pc[r,(c,E)], is obtained as follows:
7Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c1,E1). If
ri(c1,E1)=rj(c1,E1), for all i,j ∈ N, then pc[r,(c,E)] = ri(c1,E1).O t h e r -
w i s e ,g ot ot h en e x ts t e p .
Step 2. For all i ∈ N,l e tm1
i = pi(c1, E1
2 ), c2 = c1 − m1,w h e r em1 =
(m1




2 . For all i ∈ N,c a l c u l a t eri(c2,E2).
If ri(c2,E2)=rj(c2,E2), for all i,j ∈ N, then pc[r(c,E)] = m1 + ri(c2,E2).
Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step k+1. For all i ∈ N,l e tmk
i = pi(ck, Ek
2 ), ck+1 = ck − mk,a n d




2k. For all i ∈ N,c a l c u l a t eri(ck+1,Ek+1).I f
ri(ck+1,Ek+1)=rj(ck+1,Ek+1), for all i,j ∈ N,t h e npc[r,(c,E)] = m1 +
···+ mk + ri(ck+1,Ek+1).O t h e r w i s e ,g ot ot h en e x ts t e p .
If previous process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, then:




i ≤ E, then x∗ = pc[r,(c,E)].O t h e r w i s e ,pc[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the unanimous concessions procedure, if agents do not agree in the pro-
posed allocation, they receive the minimum amount assigned by the chosen
rules. Agents’ rules are then applied to the residual problem after adjusting
claims and the liquidation value. If they coincide in the allocation to the new
problem, then the procedure provides the allocation plus the concessions in the
ﬁrst stage. Otherwise, the process starts again. If it does not terminate in
a ﬁnite number of steps, then the limit of the aggregation of minimal conces-
sions (if it exists) is chosen as solution to the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets
anything.
Unanimous concessions procedure (P3) [Herrero (2003)]. Let (c,E) ∈ B
be given. Each player i ∈ N chooses a rule ri ∈ R,w i t hr−i denoting the
strategy proﬁle selected by i’s opponents. Let r =
©
ri,r −iª
be the proﬁle of
rules reported. The division proposed by the unanimous concessions procedure,
u[r,(c,E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E. For all j ∈ N, calculate rj(c1,E1). If
ri(c1,E1)=rj(c1,E1), for all i,j ∈ N,t h e nu[r,(c,E)] = ri(c1,E1).O t h e r w i s e ,
go to the next step.
Step 2. For all i ∈ N,l e tm1
i =m i n j∈N r
j




and c2 = c1 − m1,w h e r em1 =( m1
i)i∈N. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c2,E2).
If ri(c2,E2)=rj(c2,E2), for all i,j ∈ N,t h e nu[r,(c,E)] = m1 + ri(c2,E2).
Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step k+1. For all i ∈ N,l e tmk
i =m i n j∈N r
j
i(ck,Ek), Ek+1 = Ek − P
i∈N mk
i ,a n dck+1 = ck − mk. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(ck+1,Ek+1). If
ri(ck+1,Ek+1)=rj(ck+1,Ek+1), for all i,j ∈ N,t h e nu[r,(c,E)] = m1 + ···+
mk + ri(ck+1,Ek+1). Otherwise, go to the next step.
If previous process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, then




i ≤ E, then x∗ = u[r,(c,E)].O t h e r w i s e ,u[r,(c,E)] = 0.
The strategic properties of these procedures have already been explored in
the literature, as the following lemmas show.
8Lemma 1 If, for some i ∈ N, ri = cea,t h e ndc[r,(c,E)] = cea(c,E). Further-
more, in game P1,c e ais a weakly dominant strategy for the lowest claimant.
Finally, all Nash equilibria of P1 are outcome equivalent to cea.
Proof. See Chun (1989).
Lemma 2 If, for some i ∈ N, ri = p ,t h e npc[r,(c,E)] = p(c,E). Further-
more, in game P2, if there exists an agent whose preferred allocation is p ,t h e n
p is a weakly dominant strategy for her. Finally, all Nash equilibria of P2 are
outcome equivalent to p.
Proof. See Moreno-Ternero (2002).
Lemma 3 If, for some i ∈ N, ri = cel ,t h e nu[r,(c,E)] = cel(c,E). Further-
more, in game P3,c e lis a weakly dominant strategy for the highest claimant.
Finally, all Nash equilibria of P3 are outcome equivalent to cel.
Proof. See Herrero (2003).
Previous lemmas indicate that the selected procedures do not seem to pro-
vide the agents with any freedom of choice, at least under very mild (ﬁrst-order)
rationality conditions. This is because, there is always some player (the identity
of which depends on the procedure) who can force the outcome in her favor by
selecting her weakly dominant strategy. This may render these procedures as
inadequate, if we were genuinely interested in the rule selection problem, that
is, in collecting experimental evidence on how subjects reach an agreement on
claims problems in the lab. This is why we also consider an additional proce-
dure which takes the form of a coordination game, which we call the majority
procedure.
In the majority procedure, a claimant obtains the share of the liquidation
value proposed by her chosen rule only if it has been selected by a simple major-
ity of the agents (that is, all other rules have been chosen by a strictly smaller
number of players). Otherwise, she is ﬁned by ε>0. More precisely:
Majority procedure (P0). Let (c,E) ∈ B be given. Each player i ∈ N chooses
simultaneously a rule ri ∈ R,w i t hr−i denoting the strategy proﬁle selected







i (c,E) if ri i st h er u l es e l e c t e db ya simple majority;
−ε otherwise.
The strategic properties of this procedure are contained in the following
lemma, the (trivial) proof of which is here omitted.
Lemma 4 The set of strict Nash equilibria of P0 is {(r,r,...,r):r ∈ R}.
3 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe in detail the main design features of our experi-
mental study.
93.1 Subjects
Our study was conducted in ten experimental sessions in July, 2001 and May,
2003. A total of 120 students -mainly, undergraduate Economics students with
no (or very limited) prior exposure to game theory- were recruited among the
undergraduate population of the University of Alicante.
3.2 Frames
In the ﬁrst six sessions the claims problem was framed in three diﬀerent ways,
depending on the procedure being employed. The idea was to provide a frame
consistent with the (equilibrium) rule induced by the procedure.
All frames had in common that the claims problem was presented by the
hypothetical situation of a bank going bankrupt.
• Frame 1: Depositors (P1). Under this frame claimants are all bank
depositors. In this case, common-sense (and usual practice) gives priority
to smaller claims (i.e., smaller deposits), as it happens (in equilibrium)
with procedure P1.
• Frame 2: Shareholders (P2). Under this frame claimants are all bank
shareholders. This is the typical situation where, in case of bankruptcy,
each shareholder usually obtains a share of the liquidation value propor-
tional to the share of stocks in her possession, as it happens (in equilib-
rium) with procedure P2.
• Frame 3: Non-governmental organizations (P3).O u rl a s tf r a m ei s
concerned with non-governmental organizations sponsored by the bank.I n
this case, we assumed that each claimant had signed a contract with the
bank, previously to the bankruptcy situation, to receive a contribution
according with its social relevance (the higher the social relevance, the
higher the contribution). Under this framework, it would seem appropriate
to give priority to higher claimants, as it happens (in equilibrium) with
procedure P3.
• Frame 0: No frame. We also run four unframed sessions. In this case,
subjects were only provided with the payoﬀ t a b l e sa n dp l a y e dt h ef o u r
games without any story behind.
3.3 Treatments
The ten sessions were run in a computer lab.3 In the ﬁrst six sessions, subjects
were assigned to a group of 3 individuals and played twenty rounds of a framed
procedure, P1, P2 or P3, followed by twenty rounds of P0 presented under the
same frame. In the last four sessions, subjects played twenty rounds of each of
the four procedures, P1, P2, P3 and P0, without any framework. Table 1 reports
the precise sequence of procedures played in the 10 sessions.
3The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
1999).
10t r e a t1 t r e a t2 t r e a t3 t r e a t4 t r e a t5
ses1 ses4 ses2 ses5 ses3 ses6 ses7 ses8 ses9 ses10
P1 P1 P2 P2 P3 P3 P1 P1 P3 P3
P0 P0 P0 P0 P0 P0 P2 P2 P2 P2
P3 P3 P1 P1
P0 P0 P0 P0
framed unframed
(1)
Table 1: Sequential structure of the experimental sessions
As Table 1 shows, all (un)framed treatments consisted in a sequence of (four)
two procedures. In consequence, the framed sessions lasted for approximately
45’, whereas the unframed ones lasted for approximately 70’. In all sessions,
subjects played anonymously in groups of three players with randomly matched
opponents. Subjects were informed that their player position (i.e., their indi-
vidual claims in the problem) would remain the same throughout the session,
while the composition of their group would change at every round.
Instructions were provided by a self-paced, interactive computer program
that introduced and described the experiment. Subjects were also given a writ-
ten copy of the instructions (identical to those appearing on the screen) and
the payoﬀ table associated to the procedure being played. All instructions were
presented in Spanish language. The complete set of instructions translated into
English can be found in the Appendix. At the end of each round, each player
knew about the game outcome and the monetary payoﬀ associated with it.
3.4 Group size
Our decision to focus on a claims problem with three players was dictated by
several reasons. An interesting feature is that the procedures presented in Sec-
tion 2 work not only with two-agents, but also with any arbitrary number of
agents. This is not the case for bargaining procedures of a related nature, most
signiﬁcantly van Damme (1986), that only convergein the two-person case. Fur-
thermore, the situation is diﬀerent when more than two agents are involved than
in the two-agent case. When only two agents are involved, given the estate, any
amount that is not assigned to an agent is left to the other one. Nonetheless,
when more than two agents are involved, which is left should be distributed be-
tween the remaining agents. Consequently, agents may care not only about the
amount they receive, but also on the way the leftovers are distributed among
the remaining agents. By choosing three agents, we moved away from the two-
person case, but keeping the population size at a minimum. Finally, as we would
like to test the three salient rules: proportional, constrained equal awards and
constrained equal losses, by considering three agents we may built up the prob-
lem in such a way that each agent has a rule which proposes his preferred division
of the estate. Thus, a priori, all division methods have equal chance of being
chosen.
113.5 The claims problem
As we mentioned earlier, all four procedures were constructed upon the same
claims problem (c∗,E∗),w h e r ec∗ =( 4 9 , 46, 5) (i.e.,
P
ci = 100) and E∗ =2 0 .4




cel(c∗,E∗)=( 1 1 .5,8.5,0).
Since, in all sessions, subjects played more than one procedure in sequence,
we decided to focus on a single claims problem to reduce the environment vari-
ability and to facilitate subjects’ understanding of the strategic situation in
which they were involved. The main motivation for the choice of the partic-
ular problem (c∗,E∗) was to provide each claimant with a strictly preferred
allocation associated with one of the three rules. We already know, from Re-
mark 1, that, for all rules belonging to R, cel (cea) is the most preferred rule
by the highest (lowest) claimant, independently of the particular problem at
stake. However, it is not guaranteed that p were the most preferred rule by any
(in particular, the middle) claimant, unless we imposed some conditions on the
claims problem analogous to the ones above.5
There is another feature of the experimental design of the framed sessions
that should be worth to mention at this stage. As can be noticed in the instruc-
tions, the three rules were presented to subjects without using their technical
terminology (but simply referring to them as rules “A”, “B” and “C”). However,
the distributive properties of cea and cel, that is, the two rules whose simple de-
ﬁnition might have been less transparent to subjects not acknowledged to claims
problems, were explicitly mentioned in their description, stating that they were
meant to “... beneﬁt the agent with the lowest (highest) claim”. In contrast,
we omitted to mention that p was indeed the ﬁrst-best option for player 2, the
middle claimant (property we know peculiar to the speciﬁc parameterization
of our problem (c∗,E∗)). The reason for this asymmetry in the description of
the rules was twofold. On the one hand, we preferred to make sure that the
distributive properties of cea and cel were common knowledge among subjects,
in particular, with respect to the role they might have played in procedures P1
and P3. On the other hand, we wanted to see whether omitting this information
in the case of p w o u l dh a v ep r o d u c e das i g n i ﬁcant change in the behavior of the
middle claimant -in particular, with respect to her choice in P2.
3.6 Game-forms and payoﬀs
As we mentioned earlier, all procedures share the same game-form. In each ses-
sion, each player was assigned to a player position, corresponding to a particular
claim in the claims problem (c∗,E∗),w i t hc∗
i denoting player i’s claim. In each
round, each player was required to choose simultaneously a rule among cea, p
and cel. Round payoﬀs were determined by the ruling procedure.
4All monetary payoﬀs are expressed in Spanish pesetas (1 euro=166 pesetas approxi-
mately).
5There were other reasons to prefer problems suﬃciently “close” to (c∗,E∗) for our exper-
iment, which we explain in more detail in the Appendix.
12How to construct the (monetary) payoﬀ functions for our experiment was
one of the most delicate design choices. In a standard experimental session,
subjects participate to a speciﬁc “role-game” protocol after which they receive
a certain amount of money as a function of how they (and the other subjects
in the pool) played the game. In other words, subjects participating in an
economic experiment win money. On the contrary, in a real-life claims situation
claimants lose money, in the sense they get back less than what they paid (or
had the right to be repaid) sometime in the past. Distributing allocations as
vectors of non-negative amounts of money (as they are presented in this paper
and in all the literature on claims) would have simply reproduced in the lab a
particular bargaining (as opposed to claims) game in which subjects bargain,
under a certain protocol, over a particular division of the estate.
To some extent, the simple fact that subjects must leave the experimental
lab with more money than what they had at the time they arrived may be
considered incompatible with the possibility of running an experiment on claims.
To (at least partially) ameliorate this dilemma, we constructed our monetary
payoﬀ functions so that, in each round, subjects were losing the diﬀerence (out
of a predetermined endowment, known in advance) between their claim and the
share of the estate’s division assigned to them, given the ruling procedure and
the group’s strategy proﬁle.
More precisely, rule allocations in the experiment were constructed as fol-
lows:
cea(c∗,E∗) − c∗ =( 7 .5,7.5,5) − (49,46,5) = (−41.5,−38.5,0).
p(c∗,E∗) − c∗ =( 9 .8,9.2,1) − (49,46,5) = (−39.2,−36.8,−4).
cel(c∗,E∗) − c∗ =( 1 1 .5,8.5,0) − (49,46,5) = (−37.5,−37.5,−5).
By the same token, the payoﬀ matrix associated to procedure P1,a ss h o w n
in Table 2, only contains non-positive amounts.
(2)
Insert Table 2 about here.
Table 2 is exactly the same as that being used to explain subjects the game
associated with procedure P1. Player 1 (2) [3] selects the row (column) [matrix].
Each cell, corresponding to a strategy proﬁle r =( r1,r2,r 3) contains the payoﬀs
f o rp l a y e r1( ﬁrst row) 2 (second row) and 3 (third row).
Payoﬀs were obtained as follows. By Lemma 1, if ri = cea for some i ∈
{1,2,3}, then the allocation is cea(c∗,E∗) − c∗ =( −41.5,−38.5,0).I fri = rj
for all i 6= j then the allocation is ri(c∗,E∗) − c∗. The allocations of the
remaining six proﬁles were obtained using a recursive algorithm based on the
deﬁnition of P1 that leads to (10.7,8.4,0.9) − c∗ =( −38.3,−37.6,−4.1).
As we know from Lemmas 1-3, every procedure provides a player (the iden-
tity of which depends on the procedure) with a weakly dominant strategy by
which she can force her favorite outcome. In each game, we will refer to this
player as the pivotal player of that game. For the diminishing claims procedure
P1, the pivotal player is player 3 (the lowest claimant), whose weakly dominant
strategy corresponds to rule cea. However, given the reduced form used in the
experiment (subjects could only choose among cea, p and cel), also player 1
has a weakly dominant strategy (cel), while player 2 has no weakly dominant
strategies in this game.
13Analogous considerations hold for the proportional concessions procedure
P2, whose payoﬀ matrix is drawn in Table 3.
(3)
Insert Table 3 about here
Payoﬀs for this game were obtained as follows. By Lemma 2, if ri = p for
some i ∈ {1,2,3}, then the allocation is p(c∗,E∗) − c∗ =( −39.2,−36.8,−4).
If ri = rj for all i 6= j then the allocation is ri(c∗,E∗) − c∗. The allocations
of the remaining six proﬁles correspond to (−39.2,−36.8,−4), that is, to the
proportional allocation.
Here we notice that all players have a weakly dominant strategy at their
disposal: p is weakly dominant for the pivotal player 2; cea is weakly dominant
f o rp l a y e r3 ;cel is weakly dominant for player 1.
The payoﬀ matrix of the unanimous concessions procedure (P3)i sr e p o r t e d
in Table 4.
(4)
Insert Table 4 about here
Payoﬀs for this game were obtained as follows. By Lemma 3, if ri = cel for
some i ∈ {1,2,3}, then the allocation is cel(c∗,E∗) − c∗ =( −37.5,−37.5,−5).
If ri = rj for all i 6= j, then the allocation is ri(c∗,E∗) − c∗. The allocations of
the remaining six proﬁles were obtained using a recursive algorithm, based on
the deﬁnition of P3 that leads to (9.4,9.4,1.3) − c∗ =( −39.6,−36.6,−3.7).
In this case, cel is weakly dominant for the pivotal player 1; cea is weakly
dominant for player 3 while player 2 has no weakly dominant strategies.
To summarize, among the three procedures, cea (cel) always corresponds
to a weakly dominant strategy for player 3 (1), while player 2 has a weakly
dominant strategy (p)o n l yi nP2.
As we can see from Tables 2-4, all situations where agents’ rules do not
coincide (and no agent selects the corresponding equilibrium rule) lead to a
well-deﬁned limit in the division of the liquidation value. In other words, the
event of no convergence (associated with a 0 payoﬀ for all players), contemplated
in the deﬁnition of all three procedures, never occurs in our games. As it turns
out, this is not a special feature of our speciﬁc parametrization of the bankruptcy
problem (c∗,E∗) -or the constraint over the set of rules- but a general property
of all procedures, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1 For all (c,E) ∈ B and for all procedures, P1,P 2 and P3 with
arbitrary strategy set R∗ ⊆ R , the limit allocation x∗ always exists.
Proof.I nt h eA p p e n d i x .
The last procedure object of this study, the majority procedure P0,d i s p l a y s
rather diﬀerent strategic properties, as shown in Table 5.
(5)
Insert Table 5 about here
Since this procedure basically yields a coordination game, no player has a
weakly dominant strategy. (Strict) Nash equilibria correspond to those proﬁles
in which all players coordinate on the same rule.
14Payoﬀs for this game were obtained as follows. If ri = rj for all i 6= j






j respectively whereas agent k gets −1 − c∗
k.
Finally, if all agents propose diﬀerent rules, the allocation is (−1,−1,−1) − c∗.
As we mentioned earlier, payoﬀsr e p o r t e di nT a b l e s2 - 4w e r es u b t r a c t e d
to subjects’ endowments. In all sessions, before playing a procedure, all sub-
jects received an initial endowment of 1000 pesetas from which all losses were
subtracted along the 20 rounds. At the beginning of the following procedure,
subjects would receive a new endowment of 1000 pesetas, and so on. In addition,
subjects selected as players 1 and 2 received 500 pesetas as a show-up fee in the
framed sessions, and 1000 pesetas in the unframed sessions. Subjects selected as
players 3 did not receive an initial show-up fee, due to the fact that their losses
were considerably lower than the others’. This asymmetry in the show-up fees,
mainly intended to provide also players 1 and 2 with the appropriate ﬁnancial
gain, was communicated privately to each subject and we shall read the data
under the assumption that it played no role in determining subjects’ decisions.
As for procedure P0,t h ep e n a l t yε was equal to 1 peseta. Average earnings per
hour were around 1800 pesetas (11 euros) for players 1 and 2 and around 3600
p e s e t a s( 2 2e u r o s )f o rp l a y e r3 .
4R e s u l t s
In analyzing the data, we ﬁrst look at the six framed sessions (treatments 1 to 3
of Table 1). We then compare this evidence with that of the unframed sessions
(treatments 4 and 5 of Table 1) to check for framing eﬀects.
4.1 Framed Sessions
As for the six framed sessions, we ﬁrst focus on allocations, then on subjects’
behavior.
4.1.1 Allocations
Table 6 reports the relative frequencies of allocations in the six framed sessions
of P1, P2 and P3.
ALLOC.
PROC. OBS. cea p cel Others
P1 160 .98 0 0 .02
P2 160 0 1 0 0
P3 160 0 0 .98 .02
(6)
Table 6: Allocation distributions of P1,P 2 and P3 in the framed sessions.
Table 6 reports, for each procedure P1, P2 and P3, t h er e l a t i v ef r e q u e n c yo f
allocations which corresponds to each rule. The remaining category (labelled as
“Others”) pools all allocations which do not correspond to any particular rule.
We begin by noting that virtually all matches yielded the allocation associated
to the corresponding equilibrium rule. We also know, from Lemmas 1-3, that
every Nash equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the corresponding rule of that
15procedure. However, there are also other strategy proﬁles which are not equilib-
ria but yield the same allocation (take, for example, the case of P1 if players 1
and 3 select rule p and player 2 selects cea). In this respect, our evidence shows
that these strategy proﬁles occur only marginally. That is, if a particular rule
dictates the game allocation, this is because the same rule is supported by a
Nash equilibrium of the corresponding procedure.6
This striking evidence has to be compared with the allocation distributions
of the framed versions of P0, as shown in Table 7.
ALLOC.
FRAME OBS. cea p cel Others
1 160 .01 .82 0 .17
2 160 0 .69 .01 .30
3 160 0 .75 .01 .24
TOTAL 480 0 .75 .01 .24
(7)
Table 7: Allocation distributions of P0 in the framed sessions.
Remember that, in all framed sessions, P0 was played after one of the other
procedures, P1,P 2 or P3, under the corresponding frame. Table 7 shows the
allocation distributions of P0 depending on under which frame it was played.
We observe from Table 7 that the proportional rule is salient in describing
the allocation distributions in all sessions, with an average frequency of 75%
across all treatments. As Table 7 shows, if subjects succeeded in coordinating
on an equilibrium allocation, they did it by way of the proportional rule (for each
frame, coordination on cea or cel never exceeds 1% of the total observations).
M o r e o v e r ,w ea l s oo b s e r v eas i g n i ﬁcantly higher frequency (compared to those
of the framed sessions of P1,P 2 and P3) of non-equilibrium allocations -24% of
the total observations- which do not correspond to any particular rule. As it
turns out, these allocations mainly correspond to situations in which two out of
three players select the proportional rule.7
T h ep r e s e n c eo fs u c has i g n i ﬁcant proportion of non-equilibrium allocations
in P0 is mainly due to two diﬀerent reasons. On the one hand, in P0 ar u l e
dictates the game allocation if and only if all players (as opposed to a single
one) select it. On the other hand, learning eﬀects are much stronger in P0 than
in any other procedure: the average frequency of proportional allocations raises
from 75% to 90% if we consider only the last 10 rounds. We shall discuss learning
eﬀects more in detail in Section 4.2 below.
4.1.2 Behaviors
Table 8 shows, disaggregated for procedure and player position, the relative
frequencies with which subjects used the three available rules in the six framed
6Also notice that, in procedures P1-P3, a Nash equilibrium occurs if a) the pivotal player
selects the equilibrium rule (p =1 /3 if she plays random) and in case she does not (this
would occur with probability 1-p =2 /3) if the other two players select the equilibrium rule
(under random play, this would occur with probability 1/9). The expected probability of a
Nash equilibrium under random play is therefore 1/3+2 /3 ∗ 1/9 ∼ = .4. As Table 6 shows, the
relative frequencies of equilibrium outcomes are signiﬁcantly higher than this value to exclude
the possibility that they come as results of random play on behalf of subjects.
7In particular, the frequency with which two out of three subjects selected the proportional
rule under frame 1 (2) [3] was 13% (18%) [19%], with an average of 17% (that is, 71% over
the total of non-equilibrium allocations).
16sessions.
PLAYERS P1 P2 P3
1 .08 .28 .64 .02 .22 .76 .02 .06 .92
2 .15 .66 .19 .07 .76 .17 .06 .45 .49
3 .97 .02 .01 .82 .14 .04 .54 .3 .16
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(8)
Table 8: Aggregate behavior in the framed sessions of P1,P 2 and P3.
We can observe from Table 8 that pivotal players mainly used their weakly
dominant strategies. More precisely, player 3 selects her weakly dominant strat-
egy (cea)i nP1 97% of the times; in P3 player 1 selects her weakly dominant
strategy (cel) 92% of the times; in P2 the relative frequency with which player 2
selects her weakly dominant strategy p is somehow lower (76%), but still signiﬁ-
cantly higher than any other available choice. This diﬀerence in behavior might
have been caused by the fact that, as we mentioned before, unlike for cea and
cel, it was not explicitly mentioned that p was the ﬁrst-best option for player 2.
As far as non-pivotal players concerns, we also notice that, although not
as frequently as pivotal players, weakly dominant strategies are selected always
more than 50% of the times. Moreover, player 1 (3) selects her weakly dominant
strategy in a non-pivotal position more frequently in P2 than in P1 (P3).T h i s
may be due to the fact that P2 is the procedure in which pivotal player 2 dictates
her preferred allocation less often than in the other procedures and, in doing
so, raises the incentive of using their weakly dominant strategy on behalf of
non-pivotal players.8
Again, things change signiﬁcantly when we look at the aggregate behavior
in the framed sessions of P0,a ss h o w ni nT a b l e9 .
PLAYERS FRAME 1 FRAME 2 FRAME 3
1 .01 .95 .04 0 .81 .19 .02 .88 .10
2 .04 .93 .03 .02 .86 .12 .04 .92 .04
3 .12 .88 0 .07 .87 .06 .08 .9 .02
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(9)
Table 9: Aggregate behavior in the framed sessions of P0.
As Table 9 shows, independently on their player position, subjects selected the
proportional rule at least 80% of the times, with an average frequency of use of
88.5%.
4.2 Framing eﬀects
We now move to look at the experimental evidence of the four unframed sessions
to check for framing eﬀects. By analogy with Section 4.2, we ﬁrst focus on
allocations and then on subjects’ behavior.
8More precisely, player 1 played cel 64% (resp. 76%) of the times in P1 (resp. P2)a n d
player 3 played cea 54% (resp. 82%) of the times in P3 (resp. P2).
174.2.1 Allocations
The allocation distributions in the four unframed sessions are summarized in
Table 10.
RULES
PROCEDURES OBS. cea p cel Others
P0 320 .01 .54 0 .45
P1 320 .97 .01 0 .02
P2 320 0 .99 .01 0
P3 320 0 0 .98 .02
(10)
Table 10: Allocation distributions in the unframed sessions.
As for procedures, P1,P 2 and P3, Table 10 reports almost identical allocation
distributions to those of the framed sessions, yielding the corresponding equi-
librium allocation virtually in every match.9
When we look at P0 (ﬁrst row of Table 10), the proportional rule is again
salient in describing the allocation distribution in all sessions. Moreover, as it
happens in the framed sessions, if subjects coordinated on an equilibrium of
P0, they coordinated on the equilibrium supported by the proportional rule.
However, the relative frequencies of the proportional allocations (54%, 76% if
we consider the last 10 rounds) are signiﬁcantly lower compared to those of the
framed sessions (75% and 90% respectively). By the same token, the relative
frequency of (non-equilibrium) allocations in P0 is signiﬁcantly higher than those
of the framed sessions (45% against 24%).10
Table 11 conﬁrms this evidence by testing for homogeneity in the allocation
distributions of framed and unframed sessions of P0 by means of standard chi-
square statistics.11
9We run standard χ2 statistics (see footnote 11 below) to test for any diﬀerence in the
allocation distributions between framed and unframed sessions of P1,P 2 and P3. In all three
cases, the null hypothesis (no diﬀerence in the allocation distribution) was never rejected at
any reasonable signiﬁcance level.
10As it happens in the framed sessions, these non-equilibrium outcomes mainly correspond
to situations in which two out of three players select the proportional rule (27% of the total
observations).
11Consider the case of sampling from p populations, p ≥ 2, partitioned in k ≥ 2 diﬀerent
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is approximately a standard chi-square variable with (p − 1)(k − 1) degrees of freedom (e.g.,
Rohatgi (1976)). We therefore reject H0 at level α if the computed value of χ2
0 is above
χ2
(p−1)(k−1),α, or what is equivalent, if the corresponding p−value is below α. Throughout
t h ep a p e r ,w es h a l lﬁx α = .05, as the signiﬁcance level.




µ1 = µ2 = µ3 7.33 .29 7.3 .29
µ0 = µ1 = µ2 = µ3 45.39 0 36.9 0
µ0 = µ1 31.54 0 23.12 0
µ0 = µ2 11.7 .01 15.16 0
µ0 = µ3 22.04 0 7.85 .04
(11)
Table 11: Testing for homogeneity of the allocation distributions of P0
Remember that we have three diﬀerent framed treatments for P0,s i n c eP0
was played within each frame, and two unframed treatments (depending on the
sequence of procedures. As it turns out, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
allocation distributions of P0 between the two unframed treatments (treatments
4 and 5 of Table 1). In other words, our data do not show the presence of order
eﬀects in the unframed treatments. Therefore, all unframed observations of P0
are aggregated under the “FRAME 0” category. For all i =0 ,...,3,l e tµi be
the allocation distribution of P0 corresponding to frame i.T h e ﬁrst column
of Table 11 reports the null hypothesis object of test. The ﬁrst row of Table
11 tests for homogeneity in the three allocation distributions corresponding to
the three framed treatments of P0: µ1,µ 2 and µ3. Here the null hypothesis is
not rejected, whether we consider the entire dataset (“ALL ROUNDS”) or we
restrict our sample to the observations corresponding to rounds 11-20 (“LAST
10”). Also notice that the chi-square statistics are essentially the same (7.33
and 7.3 respectively). This implies that, despite the presence of learning eﬀects,
allocation distributions are always suﬃciently close over time. Things change
substantially when we also consider µ0, that is, when we test for homogeneity in
the set of framed and unframed distributions. As Table 11 shows, in this case, we
always reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in allocation distributions, both
at the aggregate level (second row) and for each treatment pair independently
(rows 3-5). This result does not depend on whether we consider the entire
dataset or we restrict our sample to the last 10 rounds. In other words, unlike
for the three procedures P1,P 2 and P3, for the majority procedure P0 framing
eﬀects seem to play a role in determining the outcome distributions, enhancing
coordination when the game is played in the context of an hypothetical claims
situation.
4.2.2 Behaviors
Table 12 reports, disaggregated for player position and procedure, subjects’
aggregate behavior in the four unframed sessions.
PLAYERS P1 P2 P3
1 .05 .2 .75 .02 .07 .91 .01 .03 .96
2 .1 .63 .27 .06 .86 .08 .14 .13 .73
3 .97 .01 .02 .8 .11 .09 .72 .18 .1
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(12)
Table 12: Aggregate behavior in the unframed sessions of P1,P 2 and P3
19Here we notice that the pivotal players choose their weakly dominant strate-
gies with a frequency even higher than in the framed sessions. More precisely,
pivotal player 3 selects her weakly dominant strategy (cea)i nP1 97% (against
97%) of the times; in P3 the pivotal player 1 selects her weakly dominant strat-
egy (cel) 96% (against 92%) of the times; in P2 the pivotal player 2 selects
her weakly dominant strategy p 86% (against 76%) of the times. As far as the
weakly dominant strategy used by non-pivotal players, we notice that it is se-
lected always more than 72% of the times. This frequency is also higher than
in the framed sessions.
We test the statistical signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences (only as far as pivotal












1-10 1.95 .38 5.09 .08 2.51 .29
11-20 3.07 .22 5.95 .06 0 1
(13)
Table 13: Testing for homogeneity in pivotal players’ aggregate behavior
For all j =1 ,...,3,l e tνF
j (resp. νU
j ) denote pivotal player j0s aggregate
behavior in the framed (resp. unframed) version of the corresponding proce-
dure (reported under parenthesis in Table 13). Given this notation, H0 : νF
j =
νU
j ,j =1 ,2,3. As Table 13 shows, pivotal players’ behavior seem not to be
sensitive to framing eﬀects in all procedures P1,P 2 and P3 (the null hypothesis
is not rejected either if we consider the entire dataset (“ALL ROUNDS”), or if
we restrict our sample to the observations of rounds 11-20 (“LAST 10”). This
reinforces the evidence of Section 4.2.1: strategic considerations seem predom-
inant in subjects’ perception of procedures P1,P 2 and P3. The absence of a
frame leads subjects even closer to equilibrium play, although this diﬀerence in
behavior is never signiﬁcant.
W en o wm o v et oa n a l y z et h er o l eo ff r a m i n ge ﬀects in the context of the
majority procedure P0. As we noticed earlier, framing eﬀects may interact with
learning eﬀects in this case, since coordination increases signiﬁcantly over time.
This is in contrast with what we found in the case of procedures P1, P2 and P3,
where the corresponding equilibrium rule distribution emerges since the very
beginning.
FRAMES Frame 0 Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3
Player Rounds cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
1 1-20 .06 .75 .19 .01 .95 .04 0 .82 .18 .02 .88 .1
1 1-10 .13 .6 .27 .02 .89 .09 0 .7 .3 .05 .79 .16
1 11-20 0 .9 .1 0 1 0 0 .93 .07 0 .96 .04
2 1-20 .08 .87 .05 .04 .93 .03 .03 .85 .12 .03 .92 .05
2 1-10 .13 .78 .09 .07 .9 .03 .03 .76 .21 .06 .85 .09
2 11-20 .02 .97 .01 .01 .96 .03 .01 .95 .04 .01 .99 0
3 1-20 .25 .69 .06 .12 .88 0 .07 .88 .05 .08 .9 .02
3 1-10 .34 .55 .11 .24 .76 0 .14 .8 .06 .12 .84 .04
3 11-20 .16 .82 .02 0 1 0 .01 .94 .05 .04 .96 0
(14)
Table 14: Aggregate behavior in P0
20Each cell of Table 14 reports the relative frequency of use of each strategy,
disaggregated for player position, under the four frames. We calculate these
distributions over the entire dataset (rounds 1-20) but also considering the ﬁrst
(1-10) and the last (11-20) rounds respectively. If we consider only the ﬁrst 10
rounds, subjects selected the proportional rule at least 55% of the times, with
an average frequency of use of 77%. If we consider only the last 10 rounds,
subjects selected the proportional rule at least 82% of the times, with an av-
erage frequency of use of 95%. These diﬀerences are always signiﬁcant, for all
frames and player positions. We also notice that player 2 “learns less” than
her opponents. This is due to the fact that, while the proportional allocation
corresponds to the second-best for players 1 and 2, it is the ﬁrst best for player
2. Therefore, the learning pattern takes the form of players 1 and 3 gradually
increasing their propensity to go for their second-best option. In this respect,
our evidence is consistent with the main literature on coordination games (see,
for example, Cooper and John (1988), Cooper and Ross (1985), Van Huyick et
al. (1990a) or Van Huyick et al. (1990b)). The presence of strategic uncertainty,
created by the multiplicity of equilibria, yields high variability in behavior in
the ﬁrst repetitions. This variability vanishes relatively quickly, once subjects
are able to coordinate on some equilibrium (in this case, the one supported by
the proportional rule). Also notice that in our game, unlike the literature cited
above, equilibrium selection cannot be due to “eﬃciency” considerations, since
all equilibria are equally Pareto eﬃcient.
Most probably, other factors may have inﬂuenced the coordination pattern.
First, as we noticed above, convergence on the proportional solution may have
been facilitated by some sort of median voter eﬀect, since the proportional rule
is the only one in which no player receives less than her second-best option. If
this were the only eﬀe c ti np l a y ,w es h o u l dn o te x p e c ts t r o n gf r a m i n ge ﬀects,
since the same argument holds for both framed and unframed treatments.
As Table 15 shows, this conjecture is rejected by our data.














j 11 − 20 9.8 .13 3.23 .78 35.96 0
ν0
j = ν1
j 1 − 20 25.26 0 3.81 .15 23.08 0
ν0
j = ν1
j 11 − 20 8.52 .01 .22 .89 15.64 0
ν0
j = ν2
j 1 − 20 10.48 .01 11.65 0 20.55 0
ν0
j = ν2
j 11 − 20 .37 .83 .9 .64 12.68 0
ν0
j = ν3
j 1 − 20 9.54 .01 2.71 .26 24.67 0
ν0
j = ν3
j 11 − 20 2.71 .26 1.41 .49 8.74 .01
(15)
Table 15: Testing for framing eﬀects in players’ aggregate behavior in P0
For all j =1 ,2,3,a n di =0 ,...,3, let νi
j denote pivotal player j0s aggregate
behavior under frame i (with i =0meaning ”NO FRAME”). As Table 15
shows, framing eﬀects are almost always signiﬁcant when we consider the entire
dataset. If we consider the last ten rounds only, we observe that are always
signiﬁc a n tf o rp l a y e r3a n ds o m e t i m e sf o rp l a y e r1 .T h es i t u a t i o ni sd i ﬀerent as
far as player 2 is concerned (but we already noticed that, whatever the reason,
she plays p with frequencies that are comparable to those of P2 since the very
21beginning). In any case, (as we know from Table 11) even if framing eﬀects
decrease over time if we look at them at the level of each player’s behavior,
the overall impact on outcome distributions remain substantial, even in the last
rounds.
We conclude this section by brieﬂy summarizing its main ﬁndings. Framing
eﬀects do not seem to play a signiﬁcant role in the case of procedures P1, P2 and
P3, games whose such strong strategic properties seem to overcome any other
consideration. A totally diﬀerent scenario comes form the analysis of P0. In this
case, players need a coordination device to achieve eﬃciency and, when they
coordinate, they do it by way of the proportional rule. Finally, frames seem to
help coordination, even when we control for the learning eﬀects typical of all
repeated coordination situations.
5 Taking the viewpoint of outside observers: sur-
vey results
Our previous results with reference to procedure P0 strongly suggest that the
proportional rule shows a particular strength as a coordination device. Further-
more, we also observed that frames help to coordinate. Given that the diﬀerent
allocation rules are often justiﬁed, in the axiomatic literature, on the grounds
of their fairness properties, we may then ask if, in our problem, a majority of
subjects perceived the proportional allocation as more just or socially appro-
priate than the alternative proposals. In other words, we may ask whether the
proportional rule may considered as a social norm to solve claims problems. If
so, selecting the proportional rule as a coordination device may be interpreted
as evidence of the power of social norms to enhance coordination and coopera-
tion in the society [see, among others, Sugden (1986), Gauthier (1986), Skyrms
(1996) and Binmore (1998)].
Along these lines, it may be worth exploring the potential of the propor-
tional rule as social norm to solve claims problems. To do so, we need therefore
to check subjects’ perception of the adequacy of the proportional rule as the
right way of solving claims problems under diﬀerent frames even when strategic
considerations are totally absent.
To this aim, we adopted the usual approach applied for resource allocation
problems, that is, we asked subjects to answer a questionnaire adopting the
perspective of an outside observer, rather than being involved in the problem
as a claimant. This survey methodology is inspired by the seminal paper of
Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and is also present in Bar-Hillel and Yaari (1993)
and Cuadras-Morató et al. (2001), among others.
More speciﬁcally, we distributed 120 questionnaires among undergraduate
students of the University of Alicante (again, with no prior exposure to bank-
ruptcy or related issues). These students were diﬀerent from those who were
recruited to run the experimental sessions in the lab. In the questionnaire,
we proposed six diﬀerent hypothetical situations in which a certain amount of
money had to be allocated among three agents with conﬂicting claims. By anal-
ogy with our experimental design, all six situations referred to the same claims
problem (c∗,E∗). Subjects were asked to select their preferred rule (among cea,
p and cel) for each individual problem at stake. The ﬁrst three situations cor-
22responded to those presented as frames 1-3 in Section 3.2, the remaining three
situations are described as follows.12
• Frame 4: Estate division and debts. Under this frame a man dies
leaving an insuﬃcient estate to cover three debts that he contracted. Then,
E∗ is interpreted as the estate and the vector of claims c∗ as the debts
contracted with each creditor.
• Frame 5: Estate division and bequests. Under this frame a man dies
having promised to each of his sons an amount of money. The value of the
bequest is not enough however to cover all his promises. Thus, his sons
are the claimants now and their claims are the promises their father made
to each of them.
• Frame 6: Taxation. The problem consists now of collecting a given
amount of money (to be understood as a tax) out of a group of three
agents, when the gross income of each agent is known. Then, E∗ is in-
terpreted as the amount to be collected and c∗ as the vector of individual
(gross) incomes.
Frames
Rules 1 2 3 4 5 6
cea 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.37 0.11
p 0.89 0.69 0.46 0.76 0.61 0.56
cel 0.06 0.25 0.41 0.10 0.02 0.33
(16)
Table 16: Results of the questionnaire
Table 16 summarizes the rules’ choices in the questionnaire’s responses. Each
column denotes the frequency of each of these three rules under the correspond-
ing frame. For instance, in frame 4, 15% of respondents selected the constrained
equal awards rule, 76% selected the proportional rule and only 10% of them se-
lected the constrained equal losses rule.
We ﬁrst observe choices vary depending on the frame. However, here again
the proportional rule remains the solution which receives the highest support in
all six cases, being the modal choice not only at the aggregate level (as Table
16 shows) but also for 90% of each individual respondent. Furthermore, 15%
of them chose the proportional rule in all six cases, whereas no other rule was
chosen for every case by any other subject.
If we restrict our attention to the (minoritarian) rules cea and cel, we observe
that they were selected with a rather similar frequency, with a slight bias in
favor of cel (15% and 19% respectively). More precisely, cea and cel received
identical support under frame 1 (in which claimants are depositors), cea was
preferred under frames 4 and 5 (the heritage situations), while cel was the
most preferred rule in the remaining cases. In other words, subjects perceived
cea more appropriate than cel in an estate division context, rather than in
heritage or taxation situations, where the preference toward cel prevails. It is
signiﬁcant the support received by cel under Frames 3 and 6 (Non-governmental
organizations and taxation), where 41% and 33% of the responses choose the
12See the Appendix for a complete description of the questionnaire.
23constrained equal losses rule. The signiﬁcant support of cel under Frame 3 agrees
with that obtained by Cuadras-Morató et al (2001), in the health care context,
where cel receives a slightly majoritarian support. This may be in consonance
with the idea that cel is a solution perceived as fair when claims are related
to needs. The support of cel under Frame 6 (taxation), also may respond to
the idea of income related to needs: people with low income should contribute
relatively less, and thus, taxation schemes should be progressive. The relatively
large support of cea under Frame 5 (37%) may be due to an interpretation of
bequests more in line with the Spanish tradition, in which a signiﬁcant part of
t h ee s t a t ei sd i s t r i b u t e dequally among the children.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we made an empirical investigation on social perception of the
adequacy of diﬀerent well known rules to solve claims problems by way of two
diﬀerent and complementary perspectives.
As for our experimental results, we can unambiguously conclude that, when
the rules of a procedure are speciﬁcally designed to induce a particular (equi-
librium rule) behavior, subjects are perfectly able to recognize the underlying
incentive structure and select the corresponding equilibrium allocation. In other
words, for the three procedures P1 − P3 employed in the experiment, the Nash
program is completely succesful.
This evidence is highlighted by the same comments made by subjects par-
ticipating in the experiment:
• “In P3 everything was determined by my own choice.”13
This is far more evident for pivotal players, those who could force the out-
come in their favor by selecting their weakly dominant strategies. In this re-
spect, our evidence conﬁrms that compliance with equilibrium is high (in our
case, practically full) in normal-form games that are solvable with one round of
deletion of weakly dominated strategies [Costa-Gomes et al. (2001)].
By stark contrast, in the majority procedure P0 coordination on the pro-
portional solution overwhelmingly prevails. Furthermore, in this case, framing
eﬀects signiﬁcantly enhance coordination. Simular conclusions can be drawn
looking at our survey results. Here again, the proportional rule is the one re-
ceiving stronger support both at the aggregate and at the individual levels.
The relevance of this result is twofold. On the one hand, it provides strong
support to a single solution to the claims problem, that is, it provides a clear-cut
answer to our original question:
the proportional solution is salient in the view of subjects both involved in
claims problems as well as for outside observers.
In this respect, it is again interesting to quote some of the explanations
provided by subjects on their choice of the proportional rule in P0:
13Debrieﬁng section of Session 7 (unframed). Subject # 4 (player 1).
24• “First, I was trying the way to maximize my payoﬀ,t h e nIr e a l i z e dt h a t
this was not possible, since everybody was acting the same way and we
were all losing money. So, we settled on an intermediate solution, which
was not the best for me, but as not the worst either.”14
• “It o o kt h em o s te q u i t a b l ec h o i c ef o rt h et h r e eo fu s . ” 15
These two quotes suggest two complementary explanations on the coordinat-
ing power of the proportional rule. First, because the proportional rule tends,
in general, to favor middle claimants and, therefore, to ease coordination when
the choice of the rule is made by majority voting. Nonetheless, this median
voter eﬀect is probably not the only one acting as a coordination device. As
the second quote suggests, the proportional rule may have been selected on so-
cial norm grounds if individuals perceived the proportional solution as the right
solution to claims problems.16
Are there any interesting implications from our study to the analysis of real-
life situations? So far, many rules in the literature have been defended on the
grounds of their ability to capture diﬀerent notions of fairness, and suggesting
that, depending on the situation at stake, these diﬀerent ideas would better
agree with what people would consider as fair [Herrero and Villar (2001)]. Our
results, nonetheless, indicate that a wide majority of subjects perceived the
proportional solution as a fair way of solving claims problems, irrespective of
the claim problem at stake and their own particular (strategic or non-strategic)
situation. In this respect, one may wonder whether alternative rules to the pro-
portional should be proposed as socially optimal to solve speciﬁc claims prob-
lems, or either, the proportional solution should be always considered instead.
Further research is required prior to answer this question, but, at least, our
results may well be of use in non neglecting a priori the use of the proportional
solution to solve any sort of claims problems.
As mentioned in the introduction, this is, to the best of our knowledge,
the ﬁrst empirical study on claims problems mixing experimental evidence and
outside observer’s positions. Our conclusions clearly state that rational players
systematically coordinate on a particular solution that, simultaneously, is the
one perceived as the fair way of solving the problem. Even taking into account
all the speciﬁc features of our study (take, for example, the choice of a single
claims problem, of the focus on the three-player case) we feel that similar results
would emerge under diﬀerent conditions. In this respect, further research is
certainly necessary to conﬁrm the salient position of the proportional rule to
solve claims problems derived from this study.
14Debrieﬁng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 9 (player 3).
15Debrieﬁng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 10 (player 3).
16An additional explanation most likely has to do with the properties the proportional
solution enjoys, in particular, its immunity to strategic manipulations. In this respect, de
Frutos (1999) has already shown that the proportional rule is the unique rule that meets this
condition.
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287A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this Section we address the convergence of procedures P1, P2 and P3 when
applied to arbitrary rule sets. We show that, for all three procedures, if the
process do not terminate in a ﬁnite number of stages, then the limit cases is
always well deﬁned.
7.1.1 Convergence of P1
Let (c,E) ∈ B be a given problem. Let r =
©
rjª
j∈N be the proﬁle of rules
reported by the agents to solve the problem, where rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N.
For the sake of simplicity in the proof we assume that all rules reported are
continuous with respect to claims.17
Fix i ∈ N and consider the sequence {ck





i =m a x j∈N{r
j
i(ck,E)}, for all k ≥ 2.
Since rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N, it is straightforward to show that {ck
i }k∈N is weakly
decreasing and bounded below by 0. Thus, it is convergent. Let xi =l i m k→∞ ck
i
and x =( xi)i∈N. Then, taking limits in the deﬁnition of the sequence, we would
have






i(ck,E)}, for all i ∈ N.
Since all rules reported by agents are continuous with respect to claims, then




i(x,E)}, for all i ∈ N.




n for all k ∈ N, and therefore x1 ≥ x2 ≥ ... ≥ xn.L e t j0 ∈ N be such




i (x,E). Then, since r ∈ R,
0=x1 − r
j0
i (x,E) ≥ xi − r
j0
i (x,E) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N.
In other words, x = rj0(x,E), which implies
P
xi = E. ¥
7.1.2 Convergence of P2
Let (c,E) ∈ B be a given problem. Let r =
©
rjª
j∈N be the proﬁle of rules
reported by the agents to solve the problem, where rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N.
For all i ∈ N, consider the sequences {(ck
i ,Ek,m k



















)), for all k ≥ 1
17This mild requirement is satisﬁed by all standard rules in the literature of bankruptcy. In
particular, it is satisﬁed by the three rules that we consider in our experiment.
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which proves the convergence. ¥
7.1.3 Convergence of P3
Let (c,E) ∈ B be a given problem. Let r =
©
rjª
j∈N be the proﬁle of rules
reported by the agents to solve the problem, where rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N.
For all i ∈ N, consider the sequences {(ck
i ,Ek,m k


























)), for all k ≥ 1
By deﬁnition, m1
1 =m i n j∈N r
j











Now, it is straightforward to show that c2
1 ≥ c2
i for all i ∈ N. Then, since
rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N,t h e nrj
n(c2,E2) ≥ E2










n . By iterating this procedure we have the following:
E2 = E −
P
i∈N m1
i ≤ (1 − 1
n) · E
E3 = E −
P
i∈N m2
i ≤ (1 − 1
n) · E2 ≤ (1 − 1
n)2 · E
...
Ek+1 = E −
P
i∈N mk
i ≤ (1 − 1
n) · Ek ≤ ... ≤ (1 − 1
n)k · E























i = E. ¥
7.2 The claims problem
All four procedures played in all experimental sessions were constructed upon
the same claims problem, where c∗ =( 4 9 , 46, 5) (i.e.,
P
ci = 100) and E∗ =2 0 .
The resulting allocations associated with each rule for this speciﬁcp r o b l e ma r e
the following:
cel(c∗,E∗)=( 1 1 .5,8.5,0),
p(c∗,E∗)=( 9 .8,9.2,1),
cea(c∗,E∗)=( 7 .5,7.5,5).
30It is straightforward to show that, for every three-agent problem (c,E) ∈ B in










3 if c1 ≤ E +2 c3 − c2
c2−c1+E
2 if E +2 c3 − c2 <c 1 <E+ c2











2 if E − 2c2 <c 3 < E
3
c2 if c3 ≥ E − 2c2
.
As we mentioned in the body of the paper, the main motivation for the
choice of the particular problem (c∗,E∗) was to provide each claimant with a
strictly preferred allocation associated with one of the three rules. This imposes
a ﬁrst restriction on the choice of the problem:
p2(c∗,E∗) > max{cel2(c∗,E∗),c e a 2(c∗,E∗)}.
We also wanted to avoid a solution in which the two claimants with lower claims
receive nothing. This imposes our second restriction:
cel2(c∗,E∗) > 0.





















We decided to choose the ﬁrst one in order to avoid ceaj = ceai for all i 6= j.









1 <E ∗ + c∗
2
(C∗ − 2c∗
2) · E∗ <c ∗
3 · c∗
c∗
3 · E∗ < (C∗ − E∗) · (c∗
1 − c∗
2)
It is straightforward to show that the problem presented above satisﬁes all
these inequalities.
7.3 The experimental instructions
In this section we present the experimental instructions. We only present here
the instructions of Session 1 and Session 7. The remaining sessions go along the
same lines, except for some diﬀerences that are introduced in footnotes.
317.3.1 Instructions of a Framed Session (Session 1)
Screen 1: Welcome to the Experiment
This is an experiment to study how people interact in a bankrupt situation.
We are only interested in what people do on average and keep no record at all
of how our individual subjects behave. Please do not feel that any particular
behavior is expected from you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will aﬀect the sum
of money you may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will ﬁnd a series of instructions explaining how
the experiment works and how to use the computer during the experiment.
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Screen 2: How you can make money
• You will be playing two sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round, for
all sessions, you and other two persons in this room will be assigned to
aG R O U P .I ne a c hr o u n d ,e a c hp e r s o ni nt h eg r o u pw i l lh a v et om a k ea
decision. Your decision (and the decision of the other two persons in your
group) will determine how much money you (and the other) win for that
round.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will select at random the
composition of your group.
• Remember that the composition of your group WILL CHANGE AT EVERY
ROUND.
• To begin, you will receive 500 pesetas just for participating in this experi-
ment.18 Moreover, at the beginning of each session, an initial endowment
of 1000 pesetas will be given to you.
• Note that the computer has assigned you a number of PLAYER (1, 2 or
3). This number appears at the right of your screen and will represent
your type of player. There are three types of players: player 1, player 2
and player 3. Every group will be always composed by three players from
diﬀerent types. Remember that you will be the same type of player along
the experiment.
• In each round, you will have to pay some of this money, depending on your
action and those of the persons in your group. The sum of the amounts
you pay in each round, will be subtracted to your initial endowment and
will constitute your TOTAL payoﬀ in this session. Remember that payoﬀs
in this experiment are such that IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WILL
WIN MONEY.
• At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money
you obtained in each session, plus the show-up fee of 500 pesetas.19
18This sentence did not appear in the case of Player 3.
19I nt h ec a s eo fP l a y e r3 :At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of
money you obtained in each session.
32When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button.
Screen 3: The First Game (I)
There is a bank which goes bankrupt. A judge must decide how its liquidation
value should be allocated among the bank’s creditors. In this experiment you
(and all other persons participating to the experiment) are creditors who go to
the court.
In this session, the bank’s creditors are all depositors,20 that is, people who
have money saved in the bank. You have to come to an agreement with the
other depositors in your group on how much of the liquidation value should be
given to each of you. Clearly (since the bank has gone bankrupt) the sum of all
claims, i.e., the sum of your deposits, is greater than the available liquidation
value.
In each round, you need to guarantee as much as possible of your claim, which
will determine your loss (the diﬀerence between your claim and the amount you
receive) in each round. The sum of these losses will be subtracted to your initial
endowment and will constitute your TOTAL payoﬀ in this session.
Concerning the problem involving you and the other two persons in your






The liquidation value is 20.
As you can observe, there is no enough liquidation value to satisfy all claims.
Remember that the player number assigned to you (1, 2 or 3) appears on
the computer screen and remains ﬁxed throughout the experiment.
Among the diﬀerent options on how the liquidation value of the bank should
be distributed, the judge has decided that you can only choose among the fol-
lowing rules:
1. RULE A, that divides the liquidation value equally among the creditors
under the condition that no one gets more than her claim. In other words,
this rule beneﬁts the agent with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B, that divides the liquidation value proportionally to claims.
3. RULE C, which makes losses as equal as possible, among creditors, subject
to the condition that all agents receive something non-negative from the
liquidation value. In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent with the
highest claim.
Concerning the problem involving you and the other two persons in your
group, the allocations corresponding to each rule are the following:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
20This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3) it is said shareholders (non-
governmental organizations which are, at least, partially, supported by the bank)i n s t e a do f
depositors.
33For instance, rule B divides the liquidation value in three parts, assigning 9.8
to player 1, 9.2 to player 2 and 1 to player 3.
Screen 4: The First Game (II)
The structure of the game is as follows:
Your decision, and the decisions of the members of your group will determine
the division of the liquidation value, as it is shown in the payoﬀ matrices. Note
that if you all agree on the same rule, then the division of the liquidation value
is exactly the one you propose.
This is how to read the matrices. There are three tables with nine cells each:
player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column and player 3 chooses the
table. Each cell contains three numbers. The ﬁrst number tells how much
money player 1 loses if that cell is selected, the second number tells how much
money player 2 loses and the third number tells how much money player 3 loses.
For instance, consider the upper left cell. This cell is selected when every player
chooses rule A. Therefore, the division of the liquidation value is the one that
rule A proposes, i.e., (7.5,7.5,5). As a consequence of this, and taking into
account the above claims, player 1 loses 7.5 − 49 = −41.5,w h i c hi st h eﬁrst
number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2 loses 7.5 − 46 = −38.5,a n d
player 3 loses 5 − 5=0 .
To summarize,
• You will be playing 20 times with changing components.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer selects your group at ran-
dom;
• In each round, you and the other two persons in your group must choose
one among the three available rules A, B and C. Your choice (and the
choices of the other two persons in your group) will determine how much
money will be subtracted to your initial endowment, as it is shown in the
corresponding table in front of you.
To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the OK button.
Screen 5: The Second Game.
Now, you are going to play 20 additional rounds of the following game. As
before, in this session, the bank’s creditors are all depositors,21 that is, people
who have money saved in the bank. You can observe from your computer screen
that the claims of each player and the liquidation value do not change.
As before, you have to come to an agreement with the other depositors in
your group on how much of the liquidation value should be given to each of you.
Remember, as before, that 1000 pesetas were assigned to you at the beginning
of the session.
21This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3) it is said shareholders (non-
governmental organizations which are, at least, partially, supported by the bank)i n s t e a do f
depositors.
34The instructions are the same as in the previous game with some slight
modiﬁcations. In each round, as before, you have to choose among rules A, B
and C. If you all agree on the same rule, in your group, then the division of the
liquidation value is exactly the one you propose. If only two of you agree on a
rule then, those who agree get the share proposed by that rule and the creditor
who does not agree in the division, not only loses her whole claim, but also
pays a ﬁxed penalty of 1 peseta. Finally, if all of you disagree on the proposed
shares, then all of you lose your claim and pay the ﬁxed penalty of 1 peseta.
The corresponding allocations to each possible situation are shown in the payoﬀ
matrices below.
The matrices are read exactly as before. For instance, consider the lower left
cell. This cell is selected when players 2 and 3 choose A and player 1 chooses C.
In this particular case, player 1 loses −1−49 = −50, which is the upper number
of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2 loses 7.5 − 46 = −38.5, and player 3
loses 5 − 5=0 .
To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the OK button.
7.3.2 Instructions of an Unframed Session (Session 7)
Screen 1: Welcome to the Experiment
This is an experiment to study how people interact. We are only interested
in what people do on average and keep no record at all of how our individual
subjects behave. Please do not feel that any particular behavior is expected
from you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will aﬀect the sum
of money you may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will ﬁnd a series of instructions explaining how
the experiment works and how to use the computer during the experiment.
When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Screen 2: How you can make money
• You will be playing four sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round, for
all sessions, you and other two persons in this room will be assigned to
aG R O U P .I ne a c hr o u n d ,e a c hp e r s o ni nt h eg r o u pw i l lh a v et om a k ea
decision. Your decision (and the decision of the other two persons in your
group) will determine how much money you (and the other) win for that
round.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will select at random the
composition of your group.
• Remember that the composition of your group WILL CHANGE AT EVERY
ROUND.
• To begin, you will receive 1000 pesetas just for participating in this exper-
iment.22 Moreover, at the beginning of each session, an initial endowment
of 1000 pesetas will be given to you.
22This sentence was not included in the case of Player 3.
35• Note that the computer has assigned you a number of PLAYER (1, 2 or
3). This number appears at the right of your screen and will represent
your type of player. There are three types of players: player 1, player 2
and player 3. Every group will be always composed by three players from
diﬀerent types. Remember that you will be the same type of player along
the experiment.
• In each round, you will have to pay some of this money, depending on your
action and those of the persons in your group. The sum of the amounts
you pay in each round, will be subtracted to your initial endowment and
will constitute your TOTAL payoﬀ in this session. Remember that payoﬀs
in this experiment are such that IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WILL
WIN MONEY.
• At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money
you obtained in each session, plus the show-up fee of 1000 pesetas.23
When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button.
Screen 3: The First Game.24
At the beginning of each round, the computer will select randomly the com-
position of your group.
In each round, you and the other two members of your group, must choose
among three possible decisions: A, B and C.
Your decision, and the decisions of the members of your group will de-
termine how much money you will lose from your initial endowment in this
session, as it is shown in the payoﬀ matrices.
This is how to read the matrices. There are three tables with nine cells each:
player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column and player 3 chooses the
table. Each cell contains three numbers. The ﬁrst number tells how much money
player 1 loses if that cell is selected, the second number tells how much money
player 2 loses and the third number tells how much money player 3 loses.
For instance, consider the lower left cell. This cell is selected when player 1
chooses C and players 2 and 3 choose A. Therefore, player 1 loses −41.5,w h i c h
is the ﬁrst number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2 loses −38.5,a n d
player 3 loses 0.
To summarize,
• You will be playing 20 times with changing components.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer selects your group at ran-
dom;
• Remember that your player number (1, 2 or 3) will keep constant through-
out the experiment.
23I nt h ec a s eo fP l a y e r3 :At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of
money you obtained in each session.
24This was the third game in Sessions 9 and 10.
36• In each round, you and the other two persons in your group must choose
one among the three available rules A, B and C. Your choice (and the
choices of the other two persons in your group) will determine how much
money will be subtracted to your initial endowment, as it is shown in the
corresponding table in front of you.
To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the OK button.
Screen 4: The Second Game.
Now, you are going to play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The
instructions are the same as in the previous game with some slight modiﬁcations.
The only diﬀerence is in the payoﬀ matrices.
For instance, consider the lower left cell. This cell is selected when players
2 and 3 choose A and player 1 chooses C. In this particular case, player 1 loses
−39.2, which is the upper number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2
loses −36.8, and player 3 loses −4.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding
letter. Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the OK
button.
Screen 5: The Third Game.25
Now, you are going to play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The
instructions are the same as in the previous game. The only diﬀerence is in the
payoﬀ matrices.
For instance, consider the lower left cell. This cell is selected when players
2 and 3 choose A and player 1 chooses C. In this particular case, player 1 loses
−37.5, which is the upper number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2
loses −37.5, and player 3 loses −5.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding
letter. Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the OK
button.
Screen 6: The Fourth Game.
Finally, you are going to play 20 additional rounds of the following game.
The instructions are the same as in the previous game. The only diﬀerence is
in the payoﬀ matrices.
For instance, consider the lower left cell. This cell is selected when players
2 and 3 choose A and player 1 chooses C. In this particular case, player 1 loses
−50, which is the upper number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2 loses
−38.5, and player 3 loses 0.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding
letter. Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the OK
button.
25This was the ﬁrst game in Sessions 9 and 10.
377.4 The questionnaire
• The ﬁrst problem
There is a bank which goes bankrupt. A judge must decide how its liquidation
value should be allocated among the bank’s creditors. In this ﬁrst problem, the
bank’s creditors are all depositors, that is, people who have money saved in
the bank. Clearly (since the bank has gone bankrupt) the sum of all claims,
i.e., the sum of your deposits, is greater than the available liquidation value.






The liquidation value is 20.
Among the diﬀerent options on how the liquidation value of the bank should be
distributed, the judge can only choose among the following rules:
1. RULE A, that divides the liquidation value equally among the creditors
under the condition that no one gets more than her claim. In other words,
this rule beneﬁts the agent with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B, that divides the liquidation value proportionally to claims.
3. RULE C, which makes losses as equal as possible, among creditors, subject
to the condition that all agents receive something non-negative from the
liquidation value. In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent with the
highest claim.
Concerning this problem, the allocations corresponding to each rule are the
following:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
For instance, rule B divides the liquidation value in three parts, assigning 9.8
to creditor 1, 9.2 to creditor 2 and 1 to creditor 3.
What would be your choice if you were the judge?
• The second problem
In the second problem, claimants are all bank shareholders instead of depos-
itors.
What would be your choice if you were the judge?
• The third problem
In the third problem, claimants are all non-governmental organizations spon-
sored by the bank. Each claimant had signed a contract with the bank, previously
to the bankruptcy situation, to receive a contribution according with its social
relevance (the higher the social relevance, the higher the contribution). Thus,
for instance, “Doctors without frontiers” should receive the higher endowment,
38“Save the children” the second highest one, and “Friends of Real Betis Balom-
pié” the lowest one. The judge must decide the amount that each one should
obtain.
What would be your choice if you were the judge?
• The fourth problem
Assume now that a man dies leaving three debts. Let the liquidation value
in the table above be the estate that he leaves and the claims be the debts
contracted with each creditor.
What would be your choice if you were the judge?
• The ﬁfth problem
In the ﬁfth problem, a man dies having promised to each of his sons an
amount of money. The value of the bequest is not enough, however, to cover
all his promises. Thus, his sons are now the claimants and their claims are the
promises the father made to each of them.
What would be your choice if you were the judge?
• The sixth problem
In this case, the situation is diﬀerent. The problem consists now of collecting
a given amount of money out of a group of three agents, when the gross income
of each agent is known. You can interpret the amount to be collected as a






The amount to be collected is 20.
We restrict our attention to three diﬀerent tax schemes that are the following
for this problem at stake:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
Each one says the amount that each agent has to pay in order to collect the
previous amount. For instance, rule B forces agent 1 to pay 9.8, agent 2 to pay
9.2 and agent 3 to pay 1.






































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Procedure P0
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